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by RONALD GREGOR SMITH
Between Johann Georg Hamann (1730-88) and S0renKierkegaard(i8i3-55) 
there was an extraordinary connexion. Hamann indeed was the figure who 
more than any other of modern times influenced Kierkegaard both in the 
form and content of his authorship and also, at a deeper level, in his very 
existence.
It is notoriously difficult to understand Hamann’s writings, and it is per­
fectly possible for varying interpretations to be established with some show 
of consistency with Hamann’s own words. The trouble is that Hamann’s 
range is so wide, and so deep, that his epigones do not find it easy to reflect 
his richness. As Lessing wrote in a letter to Herder:
His writings seem to be given out as tests for those gentlemen who call 
themselves polybistores. For you really do need a bit of panhistory in 
order to read them. A traveller can be easily found; but a mere stroller 
is hard to come upon.2
(Seine Schriften scheinen als Prüfungen der Herren aufgesetzt zu sein, 
die sich für Polyhistores ausgeben. Denn es gehört wirklich ein wenig 
Panhistorie dazu. Ein Wanderer ist leicht zu finden; aber ein Spazier­
gänger ist schwer zu treffen).
Yet in spite of those difficulties, and in spite of the fact that I am not one of 
those polyhistores of whom Lessing speaks, I am not entirely convinced that 
Lessing is right when he attributes to Hamann a certain inconsequentiality 
and lack of deliberation in his interests. Nor is it enough to rescue Hamann 
from oblivion by setting him in the literary context of influences upon him 
and effects of his thoughts upon others. The grandiose edition of his works
1 Based on a lecture given at Marburg University, June 12, 1963, on the occasion of the 
conferring on the author of an honorary doctorate of theology.
2 January 25, 1780.
with commentaries deserves every praise3, but his significance is not exhausted 
by this kind of treatment. And if the impulse which Hamann gave to the 
German Romantic movement is not the whole story of Hamann, neither can 
it be confined within the story of his relation to Kierkegaard, far less within 
the story of his somewhat ambiguous acceptance in the early stages of the 
dialectical theology of this century.4
However, my purpose here is the modest one of elucidating the relation 
between Kierkegaard and Hamann. The ambivalent nature of this relation, 
which was compounded of attraction and a kind of fear, is well illustrated 
in an entry in Kierkegaard’s journal for May 22, 1839:
It can be said of Hamann what is written on a stove near Kold in Fre- 
densborg: allicit atque terret.5
It is especially in the journals that the pervading personal influence of Ha­
mann may be traced, although in the published works, too, there are con­
nexions of thought and interest, both explicit and implicit, which are more 
frequent and significant than have hitherto been noted, so far as I am aware, 
in any published work.6
3 J. G. Hamanns Hauptschriften Erklärt, edd. Blanke u. L. Schreiner, Gütersloh, 1 9 5 6 S S .
4 E.g., in H. E. Weber’s Zwei Propheten des Irrationalismus, 1917.
5 Papirer II A 442.
8 Wilhelm Rodemann’s Hamann und Kierkegaard, Gütersloh, 1922, Teildruck, Phil. Disser­
tation, Erlangen 1912, is a disappointing exercise, being not only incomplete in its refe­
rences (to some extent understandable at the date of production) but also, more seriously, 
being content with superficial connexions. The following are the references in the Jour­
nals and in the works which I have discovered. The references are to the Papirer, ed. P. 
A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr (and E.Torsting), 1909-48, and to the Samlede Værker2, ed. A.B. 
Drachmann, J.L. Heiberg and H.D.Lange, 1920-36. I A 75, I A 100, I A 123, I A 233, 
I A 234, I A 237, I A 340; IIA 2, 12, 75, 78, 102, 105, 114, 118, 136, 138, 139, 214, 215, 
259, 438, 442, 623, 658; III A 49, 235; IV A 122; V A 29; VI A 5, 6; VII A 236; VIIIA 
251; IX 444, 475 (? -  reference to »heterogeneity«, cf. Hamann’s letter to Herder, June 
3, 1781: »This fear in the world is the sole proof of our heterogeneity«): X1 A 324; 
X2 A 225; X3 A 51, 53, 54, 69, 91, 319. The reference in I A 75 is on my view the 
first reference to Hamann, where in the course of his excursion to Gilleleie, K. writes, 
August i, 1835: »What good would it do me if truth stood before me, naked and cold, 
not caring whether I recognised her or not?« Cf. H/s letter to Kant, July 27, 1759: »Die 
Wahrheit wollte sich von Strassenräubern nicht zunahe kommen lassen, sie trug Kleid 
auf Kleid, dass man zweifelte ihren Leib zu finden. Wie erschracken (sie), da sie ihren 
Willen hatten und das schreckl. Gespenst, die Wahrheit, vor sich sahen«.
SV I 253, III 66, 212 f., IV 245 f., 302, 306, 402, 472, 474, V 54, VI 104, 109, 117, 130, 
149, ij9, 206, VII 236, 277, 549.
What I wish to maintain is that concurrently with the weakening of Ha­
mann’s influence upon Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard reached a more and more 
unsatisfactory understanding of Christian existence.
Now of course there were many different reasons which contributed to 
lead Kierkegaard away from Hamann to his final position -  to a view which 
Fritz Lieb has justly described as »spiritualism«7. First there are the well- 
known biographical events, especially the broken engagement and the con­
flict with the satirical journal The Corsair. And secondly, the major role 
played in Kierkegaard’s life by suffering (though in a more detailed analysis 
it would have to be shown that this role was by no means identical through­
out his life), and the increasing importance of the category of the single one 
(hiin enkelte), cannot be properly appraised without a special understan­
ding of Kierkegaard’s passionate inwardness and its highly dialectical rela­
tion to his whole authorship, including the diaries. The inwardness he cer­
tainly shared with Hamann-one has only to think of Hamann’s own words 
in the Kreuzzüge des Philologen: »nichts als die Höllenfahrt der Selbst- 
erkänntnis bahnt uns den Weg zur Vergötterung«8. He also shared with 
Hamann -  at least formally -  a hatred of the »system« and of speculation. 
But he was led by these elements in his life and thought -  the personal rela­
tionships and the passionate demand for existence rather than uncommitted 
reflection -  to a highly individual understanding of Christianity which was 
very different from Hamann’s. In brief, he was led to a position in which 
he wished to present Christianity as a direct communication, involving, it 
is true, radical decision, personal witness, and martyrdom. But he did this 
as an author rather than in his life. As he himself said, he wished to be the 
»poet of the religious«. His authorship therefore stands in the end separate 
from his biography, close though the connexions between his authorship and 
his biography undoubtedly are.
It was the tension between the biography and the authorship which led 
Kierkegaard to turn the screw of paradox to an agonising extreme. He 
presented Christianity as an offence, and identified Christianity with suffe­
ring. If he had abided by his early enthusiasm for Hamann, he would cer-
7 Sophia und Historie, p. 309.
8 Werke, ed. Nadler, II, p. 164.
tainly have retained a more balanced view of faith. It is also of course true 
that in that case he would have ceased to be the Kierkegaard we know, able 
to attract and terrify us in his turn.
The fascination which Hamann exerted upon Kierkegaard in his early 
years reaches its fullest strength in certain journal entries of the year 1837, 
when Kierkegaard was just 24 years of age. They are all concerned with the 
concept of humour. The most striking are the following:
Humour is irony carried through to its greatest vibration, and although 
the Christian element is the real primus motor there are nevertheless 
to be found in Christian Europe people who have got no further than 
describing irony, and have therefore never been able to achieve humour 
as absolutely isolated and personally solitary: therefore they either 
seek rest in the church, where the whole gathering of individuals 
develops, in humour about the world, a Christian irony ... or, when 
the religious does not come into movement they form a club ... No, 
Hamann is surely the greatest and most authentic humorist, the real 
humorous Robinson Crusoe, not on a desert island, but in the tumult 
of life. His humour is not an aesthetic concept, but life .. .9 
Secondly, and even more explicitly about Hamann:
Hamann could be regarded as a good example of the humorous ten­
dency in Christianity ... But this is developed in him in a one-sided 
way, as a necessary consequence a) of the humour in Christianity as 
such, b) of the isolation of the individual conditioned by the Reforma­
tion ... where the humour is in opposition to everything and hence 
fairly sterile. But this was not the case with Hamann, and the reason 
must be sought in his profound spirit and great genius ... and c) of his 
own natural humorous bent. So that one can say with truth that Ha­
mann is the greatest humorist in Christianity, and that means the greatest 
humorist in the point of view which itself is the most humorous point 
of view in world history -  and therefore he is the greatest humorist in 
the world.10
9 Papirer, II A 136.
10 Papirer, II A 75.
Lastly, there is one brief but profound remark:
The Christian humorist is like a plant whose roots alone are visible, 
whose flowers unfold in a higher sun.11 
What does Kierkegaard mean by humour in these early journal entries? At 
this stage he is not entirely clear. The clarity, and with it the fixation of the 
concept in a scheme which has abandoned Hamann’s view of humour, comes 
only later, in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Kierkegaard is still at 
this early stage not entirely successful in separating the concept of irony 
from that of humour. This comes out more clearly in certain other entries. 
For instance, he speaks of Christ’s humour in the words, »My yoke is easy 
and my burden is not heavy«, and remarks: »It is surely heavy to the highest 
degree, the heaviest that can be thought -  self-denial«.12 Earlier in the same 
entry he speaks of the humour »which lies in Christianity in general, 
expressed in the statement that the truth is hidden in the mystery ... which 
is precisely the view of life which humorises to the highest degree the clever­
ness of the world«. This leads to Christian ignorance, »the pure Socratic 
view, as we find it, for example, in Hamann«, which is »by nature also 
humorous«.
But this is not consistent with Kierkegaard’s insight that Hamann’s view 
of humour is more than a concept, more than a method for understanding 
the contradictions between Christianity and the world, but is, as he says, 
life itself. It is certainly true that even at the level of irony there are close 
affinities between Hamann and Kierkegaard. Hamann, like Kierkegaard, 
did indeed understand the Christian mystery of the condescension of God 
in Christ in terms of irony, of a Christian-Socratic ignorance, and of hu­
mility. The contrast between Christianity and the wisdom of the world runs 
through all that he thought and was. Yet Hamann’s view is not exhausted 
in the consequent sense of incongruity, which could at best lead to treating 
life as an isolated joke. Nor indeed is Kierkegaard’s positive appreciation 
of Hamann at this stage exhausted by this reduction of the place of humour 
in Christianity to an isolated tendency which is expressed simply in a vivid 
sense of contrasts and incongruities.
11 Papirer, II A 102, July 6, 1837.
12 Papirer, II A 78.
At this point the difficulty of defining the positive content of humour is 
very great. It is a difficulty akin to that which we have with many concepts 
and views which we all live with in various degrees of acceptance, such as 
freedom, or democracy. We may justly say that we share a common under­
standing of such things -  so long as we are not required to define them.
We can approach the matter best by recalling how Hamann understood 
his own life.13 As he said himself, his whole life was a learning »von unten 
zu dienen«.14 But this did not mean a naive pietism. His surrender was 
conscious, it was filled with joy, but it was also total. »Auch in der Küche 
sind die Götter«, he wrote to Jacobi, »und was Cartes von seinem Cogito 
sagt, davon überführt mich die Thätigkeit meines Magens«.15 In other 
words, his life was not based upon a dichotomy between soul and body, or 
upon a gnostic separation of spirit from all the rest of creation, but upon 
what he called »das edle Sum«, upon the »noch Hebräischer, Est ergo 
cogito«.16 The basis of his life is the givenness of life in a single body-spirit 
unity. Thus the words of the English poet Young, which were significantly 
reproduced by Kierkegaard on the title-page of Either/Or:
Are passions then the pagans of the soul,
Reason alone baptized?
are for Hamann more than the motto for the importance of the aesthetic 
sensibility. Rather, for him they point to God as active in nature as well as 
in history; they point to a faith in the reality of creation which comes from 
a faith in the revelation in Christ. In the Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten he 
writes:
Doch vielleicht ist die ganze Geschichte ... gleich der Natur ein ver­
siegelt Buch, ein verdecktes Zeugnis, ein Räthsel, das sich nicht auflösen 
lässt, ohne mit einem andern Kalbe, als unserer Vernunft zu pflügen.17 
And the ox with which he ploughed was faith. The controlling element in 
the human situation, to which this faith is the response, is the constant acti-
13 For a fuller discussion of Hamann’s life and thought the reader may be referred to the 
present writer’s J.G. Hamann: a study in Christian existence, London, i960.
14 Briefwechsel, edd. W. Ziesemer and A. Henkel, II, 192.
15 C. H. Gildemeister, Hamann’s Leben und Schriften, V, 476.
16 Gildemeister, V, 81.
17 Nadler, op. cit., II, 65.
vity of God through the whole of creation, both nature and history. God 
himself is the Giver, and at the same time he is the resting-point. For Ha­
mann the Christian’s criterion is therefore the eternity of God, which is to 
be discerned not in any separated activity of the autonomous reason, nor in 
any isolated activity of the religious or the aesthetic sense, but in the com­
plex and continuous activity of God in his condescension throughout nature 
and history. This faith in this activity of God is at the same time strictly 
eschatological: it is not continuous like a natural process, but is ever renewed 
in the present.
Thus on November 14, 1784 he writes to Jacobi as follows:
Alles ist eitel -  nichts neues unter der Sonne -  ist das Ende aller Meta­
physik und Weltweisheit, bei der uns nichts übrig bleibt als der Wunsch, 
die Hoffnung und der Vorschmack eines neuen Himmels und einer 
neuen Erde -  in schönen und lieblichen aber ebenso vergänglichen und 
flüchtigen Augenblicken, wie die Liebe in Wollüsten.18 
Here we may see how Hamann’s attitude to the world is determined by 
an eschatological anticipation of a new heaven and a new earth: this means 
the anticipation of an ultimate peace which comes from God. It comes from 
the serenity of God, but it does not leave out the reality of the world. The 
relation with eternity is thus not direct; it remains a relation of faith. And 
it is expressed by Hamann in the whole course and deliberate intentions of 
his life, in a strict and constant engagement with the things and persons of 
his daily existence. We may therefore say that by means of his eschatological 
faith he is taken out of the world, but he is also straightway thrown back 
into the world. The reference to eternity is therefore to be found, and con­
firmed, within the life of the senses, in humility, in the life of children, even 
in the life of Pharisees or by means of Balaam’s ass: in brief, through the 
sensibility or Empfindung and not by means of abstractions or speculative 
systems. The roots of the plant of faith are deep in the earth, and the way 
to the higher sun is not reached by cutting those roots: neither general world- 
denial, nor personal asceticism, is able to achieve or to express this faith. 
There is certainly an element of resignation in Hamann’s life; but it is not 
the ironical resignation or disengagement such as we find in David Hume, 
18 Gildemeister, op. cit., V, p. 17.
who gave up philosophizing, and took to writing history, and playing back­
gammon with his ministerial friends of the Church of Scotland in Edin­
burgh. But we see in Hamann the expression of a thoroughly eschatological 
faith which, because it has overcome the world, is able to affirm it to the 
full. It is this kind of living faith which Kierkegaard sees in Hamann and 
describes as his humour.
As Kierkegaard himself says later, if he had known at the time of 
Hamann’s »marriage of conscience« with Anna Regina, his own relation 
to his Regine might well have been different.19 We may add that his relation 
to the world, and his view of Christianity, might well have remained closer 
to that of Hamann. Indeed, as early as 1843 he had an inkling of this, when he 
confessed in his diary: »If I had had faith, I should have remained with Re­
gine«.20 Hamann did have faith, of such a kind that he did not marry his 
Regina according to the forms of the world. But he lived with her in faithful 
and humorous acceptance of the mala domestica and gaudia domestica all 
his life. This marriage is perhaps the best illustration of Hamann’s faith in 
God, whom he recognised primarily as giving, not demanding, and giving, 
moreover, the possibility of a life at peace with him: thus Hamann’s life in 
humour may be seen as a clue to God’s relation with the world.
There are however other elements in Hamann’s writings which fill out the 
picture of the attraction and the repulsion which Kierkegaard felt. The first 
significant connexion between the two is an entry in Kierkegaard’s diary 
for September 10, 1836. Here we read:
Hamann suggests a very interesting parallel between the Law of Moses 
and reason. He starts from Hume’s words, »the last fruit of all worldly 
wisdom is the recognition of human ignorance and weakness« ... Our 
reason, says Hamann, is therefore just what Paul calls the law -  and 
the command of reason is holy, righteous and good. But is reason given 
to us to make us wise? As little as the law was given to the Jews to 
make them righteous, but to convince us of the opposite, how un­
reasonable our reason is, and that our errors must increase through it, as 
sin increased through the law.
19 Papirer VIII A 251.
20 Papirer IV A 107.
And to this entry Kierkegaard adds another quotation from Hamann:
Ist es nicht ein alter Einfall, den du oft von mir gehört: incredibile sed 
verum? Lügen und Romane müssen wahrscheinlich sein, Hypothesen 
und Fabeln; aber nicht die Wahrheiten und Grundlehren unseres 
Glauben.21
One sees here how Kierkegaard was attracted by Hamann’s splendid ability 
to tackle the problem of faith at the very point where the Enlightenment, 
in the person of David Hume, had reached its limit. When Hume said that 
»mere reason is insufficient to convince us of the veracity of faith«, Hamann 
replied, »That’s just how it is«. For »Glauben geschieht so wenig durch 
Gründe, als Schmecken und Sehen«.22 When Hume said, presumably in 
mockery, that you are persuaded »of a continual miracle«, Hamann himself 
was unashamedly convinced of that miracle.
Later Kierkegaard noted with approval that »it is the highest degree of 
irony for Hamann to say somewhere that he would rather hear the truth 
from a Pharisee against his will than from an apostle or an angel«.23 Ha- 
mann’s exact words, in a letter to Lindner, were:
Ich habe Ihren Herrn Schwager noch nicht gehört, und wähle mir keine 
Prediger mehr, sondern nehme für lieb mit dem, der liebe Gott giebt. 
Baumgarten, Reichel, Forstmann, Paulus und Cephas sind Menschen, 
und ich höre öfters mit mehr Freude das Wort Gottes im Munde eines 
Pharisäers, als eines Zeugen wieder seinen Willen, als aus dem Munde 
eines Engels des Lichts.24
But this seems to me to be more than irony, or a clever turning of the tables 
on Hume. Of course it is a declaration of war on a too narrow concept of 
reason, and this is doubtless what attracted Kierkegaard in the first instance 
to Hamann. For Kierkegaard was seeking a way out of the conflict which 
he knew in himself between philosophy and Christianity. At this point, 
therefore, we may see the closeness of the two in their movement away from 
the norms of the Enlightenment. And it was from this point, from the deli­
21 Papirer I A 237.
22 Nadler, II, p. 74.
23 Papirer II A 2.
24 Briefwechsel, I, p. 431.
berate assertion of the positive possibility of faith, that Kierkegaard moved 
into his massive attack upon the customary Christian apologetic in terms 
of the traditionel proofs of the existence of God, and with its assumption 
that intellectual certainty was basic to faith.
Similar, too, is the starting-point for Kierkegaard’s discussion of Lessing’s 
necessary truths of reason, independent of contingent truths of history. 
Lessing for Kierkegaard played approximately the part that Hume played 
in Hamann’s thought. And the common ground is clear. When Hamann, in 
a letter to Jacobi of February 18, 1786, writes:
Denn wenn die Narren sind, die in ihren Herzen das Dasein Gottes 
laugnen, so kommen mir die noch unsinniger vor, die selbiges erst be- 
weisen wollen,
then it is clear that from this and similar utterances Kierkegaard found 
support for his attack on all systematic formulations as a substitute for an 
existential decision. That Kierkegaard ended as an anti-rationalist cannot, 
I think, be denied. It is, however, by no means so clear that Hamann can 
be so described (far less as an irrationalist). Kierkegaard moved in a straight 
line from Lessing to the need for that very salto mortale which Lessing could 
not take. But Hamann held on to his basic apprehension of the presence of 
God in his life in and through the signs given to him in and through the 
world. Certainly, both Hamann and Kierkegaard speak of the impossibility 
of a system of existence. Hamann could say: »Das System ist an und fur 
sich ein Hindernis zur Wahrheit«,25 and Kierkegaard adds, more precisely 
still, »the humorist has no system«.26 And in the Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript he writes that there is a system of existence only »for him who 
is both inside and outside existence, eternally complete and yet containing 
existence in himself, namely God«.27 For Kierkegaard the truth of Christi­
anity is objectively uncertain, and subjectively true. But for Hamann the 
key to Christian existence is not the absurd, but God’s continuous and 
absolute condescension. The connexion between God and the world is not 
broken. So Hamann’s faith retains, through the events of the historical
25 Gildemeister, op. cit. V, p. 228.
26 Papirer II A 140.
27 SV2 VII, p. 107.
world, an intimate relationship with reason. His clearest words on the rela­
tion of reason to faith are probably to be found in a letter to Jacobi, where 
he writes:
Unsere Vernunft muss warten und hoffen -  Dienerin, nicht Gesetzge­
berin, der Natur sein wollen. 28
One is forced to recognise, nevertheless, that there is a basic affinity between 
Kierkegaard and Hamann, echoes of which are to be heard even as Kierke­
gaard is moving far away from Hamann. Thus Kierkegaard quotes Ha- 
mann’s words with approval in the Concept of Dread:
Diese Angst in der Welt ist aber der einzige Beweis unserer Heteroge- 
neität. Denn fehlte uns nichts, so würden wir es nicht besser machen, 
als die Heiden und Transcendental-Philosophen, die von Gott nichts 
wissen, und in die liebe Natur wie die Narren vergaffen; kein Heimweh 
würde uns anwandeln. Diese impertinente Unruhe, diese heilige Hypo­
chondrie, ist vielleicht das Feuer, womit wir Opfertiere gesalzen und 
vor das Fäulniss des laufenden seculi bewahrt werden müssen.29 
Kierkegaard shared to the full Hamann’s sense of being an exception, a 
single person, full of contradictions, who recognised himself as called by 
God precisely through this knowledge of his difference or heterogeneity. 
»Periissem nisi periissem«, says Hamann repeatedly,30 and Kierkegaard re­
peats after him, »periissem, nisi periissem is and remains the motto of my 
life«;31 and he uses these words as the motto for a part of Stages on Life’s 
Way. And again, in Fear and Trembling, the most personal of all Kierke­
gaard’s writings -  at least in its primary impulse -  Kierkegaard asks the 
question about the teleological suspension of the ethical. He is speaking 
ostensibly of Abraham’s intention to sacrifice Isaac, but the source of his 
question is his own experience of the breaking of his engagement with Re- 
gine, where the ethical demand is violated for the sake of a higher demand. 
We can better understand Kierkegaard’s agonising effort to grasp the nature
88 Gildemeister, op. cit. V, p. 16.
“ SV2 IV, p. 472; cf. Papirer III A 235.
30 E. g. Hamanns Schriften, ed. Roth, III, pp. 151, 224.
31 Papirer IV A 48.
of faith when we keep in mind Hamann’s treatment of the same theme. In 
his little essay on the Wise Men from the East, the Magi aus Morgenlande, 
he raised the same question. For the coming of the wise man to worship 
Christ had introduced the possibility, and the actuality, of disaster: the 
slaughter of the innocents and the flight into Egypt of the new-born King 
of the Jews. »Es giebt Handlungen höherer Ordnung«, writes Hamann, »für 
die keine Gleichung durch die Elemente dieser Welt heraus gebracht werden 
kann«.32
Yet once again we must note how different the consequences were for 
Kierkegaard than for Hamann. For Hamann his position as an exception 
and as a single person, and the very wilderness in which he preached, did 
not lead him into isolation. Bus as it were by a divine sleight of hand the 
wilderness became the ordinary world of relationships in which he lived; 
whereas for Kierkegaard the wilderness was increasingly the construction 
of his own solitude.
Yet almost from the beginning of his attraction to Hamann Kierkegaard 
felt certain reservations. In an entry of the diary for 1837 we read:
Humour can approach the blasphemous. Hamann will rather hear wis­
dom from Balaam’s ass or from a philosopher against his will than 
from an angel or an apostle.33 
And in the same year he adds:
This polemic [of Hamann’s] goes too far, and sometimes has something 
blasphemous in it, almost as though he wanted to tempt God.34 
Our first reaction is one of astonishment. What is the point of Kierkegaard’s 
qualms? Is Kierkegaard after all not the prophet of indirect communica­
tion? Why should the truth not come better from Balaam’s ass or from a 
philosopher against his will than from an apostle or an angel? Is this not 
precisely what Kierkegaard wanted, with his immense stress on the indirect 
communication of the possibility of offence and the possibility of faith? And 
did he not share with Hamann the need for pseudonymity, for seeming 
worse than you are, for the lack of direct authority and the consequent
32 Nadler, Werke, II, p. 140.
33 Papirer II A 10 j.
34 Papirer II A 12.
affirmation of the maieutic method which both of them admired so much 
in Socrates?
It is certainly true that Kierkegaard appeared to the world worse than 
he was. But there is a real difference here. Hamann lived out in his life what 
Kierkegaard proposed for himself as an ideal possibility. Hamann was 
thoroughgoing, and wrote all his works under pseudonyms. Kierkegaard 
sought in the end a way of directness. Even in his early days, alongside the 
aesthetic, pseudonymous writings, he published the Edifying Discourses under 
his own name. And in the end he reached a point which he described as that 
of immediacy after reflection, the second immediacy. At this point, in virtue 
of the paradox, he denied the relation of God to the world, and Christianity 
became identified with suffering, the suffering of the single person. In the 
strength of the paradox he denied the world, and his last writings were a 
direct and undialectical attack on the church in Denmark. But Hamann 
remained the humorist to the end. For him »lässt sich Gott ... gerade auf 
die Welt ein«,35 and it is precisely this connexion of God and the world 
which both demands and makes possible the attitude of the humorist to the 
very end.
The deep difference between the two at this point might well be sum­
marised in their respective attitudes to Luther. »Ich lutherisiere«, said Ha­
mann once, and he never left the Lutheran fold. Kierkegaard on the other 
hand became increasingly critical of Luther. The later diary abounds in such 
criticism. Basically this criticism sprang from Kierkegaard’s increasing in- 
teriority, and spiritualising of faith, with the concomitant assertion of the 
primacy of paradox as the category of Christianity. In fact one might 
almost say that he demanded the paradox as a kind of pre-requisite for 
understanding Christianity -  a very different demand, it seems to me, from 
that of Rudolf Bultmann as a hermeneutical principle.
In brief, therefore, we may say that Kierkegaard located the blasphemous 
element in Hamann’s view in Hamann’s indirect and humorising relation 
to the divine revelation, in which the incognito of God in the world was 
never overcome.
At the same time one must recognise that Kierkegaard was conscious from 
35 Hamanns Hauptschriften erklärt, ed. Karlfried Gründer, I, p. 50.
a very early stage of his disagreement with Hamann. In the analysis of the 
spheres of existence, in the Stages on Life’s way, and in the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, we find a subtle and massive rejection of humour as 
the mark of Christian existence. It is only in the strength of Hamann’s life, 
as he understood it, and as I re-enact it in my understanding, that I dare to 
reject Kierkegaard’s final position.36
Humour, writes Kierkegaard in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
is a heathen speculation which has come to know the Christian element. »It 
can come deceptively near to the Christian position ... but where the deci­
sion grasps the existing single person ... where the decision takes place in the 
moment, and the movement drives forward to a relation with the eternal 
truth, which stepped into existence in time: there the humorist cannot 
follow«.37 »The Christian position inheres in the decision and decisiveness«,38 
whereas humour is only the last terminus a quo for the determination of the 
Christian position. Humour means disengagement. Or, as he says in the 
Stages on Life’s Way, humour is the last confinium before the religious. »The 
humorist touches in pain the mystery of existence, and then goes home 
again«.39
It seems to me that this view of Christianity ultimately means the destruc­
tion not only of the understanding but also of the world. As Kierkegaard 
himself says, »in my relationship to God I have to learn to give up my finite 
understanding«.40 But we must say against this that the God-man, despite 
every temptation, is not against but for the world. Precisely in his suffering 
he is for the world. The end is not the exception, separated from the world,
36 Yet even at this point I must enter a reservation. K’s final position is not to be under­
stood as a naive summons to a sectarian existence. His attack on the church is to be seen 
as the presentation of the ideal which as a »poet of the religious«, a »spy in the service 
of God«, and the like, he felt called to witness to. Thus neither the Diary of his last 
years, nor the brilliant pamphlets of the Instant, should be regarded as the expression 
of K’s own biography: the directness which is here presented is not a directness of life, 
but a literary form. Nevertheless, Hamann, who never really wrote for writing’s sake, 
far less in order to portray an ideal Christianity, kept himself from any such directness. 
His tierische Ernst, unlike K’s, was controlled by humour.
37 SV2 VII, p.259. 
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39 SV2 VII, p. 437.
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but the society of faith in which the world is overcome, and thus renewed 
and restored. If Kierkegaard here objects that this is sheer immanence, then 
I answer with Hamann that the Christian humorist, precisely in the strength 
of his eschatological decision, is at once thrown back into the world. The 
humorist does not just go home again, after he has touched the pain of 
existence. He takes it with him into the world, but he does not see it as the 
ultimate mystery of existence. This does not mean that Hamann offers us a 
theologia gloriae without the cross. But it means that he discerns, not suf­
fering, but humour as the form of faith in the world. For him, therefore, 
humour is the expression of the faith that God holds everything in his hand. 
That means that in Christ he is completely bound up with the world, but 
precisely in and through this binding he is sovereign and free over against 
the world. His love for the world can be grasped in and through the suffering 
of Christ. But it is not imprisoned in the suffering of Christ. Yet even through 
the suffering of Christ, on Hamann’s view, we may discern the peace of God, 
which is the heart of his humour.
It is true that no reader of Kierkegaard’s diaries will wish to deny that 
he too knew the reality of this eschatological peace. I am bound, therefore, 
to draw the conclusion that his categories, and especially the category of the 
paradox, are not an adequate expression of his own experience of faith. I 
am by no means inclined to suggest that the category of the paradox, and 
with it the determination of Christianity as suffering, is merely false. On 
the contrary, it is immensely fruitful, as Kierkegaard himself says, »as an 
ontological determination, which expresses the relation between an existing 
knowing spirit and the eternal truth«.41 But this determination is not the 
last word in that relation.
One of Kierkegaard’s last jottings shows us the destructive end:
What does God desire? He desires souls who can praise and pray and 
adore him -  the business of angels. That is why God is surrounded by 
angels. For he does not desire the kind of beings of whom there are 
legions in Christendom, who are ready to trumpet his praises for ten 
shillings. No, it is angels that please him. And what pleases him more 
than angels is a man who, in the last lap of his life, when God is trans- 
41 Papirer, 1847 (exact reference mislaid).
formed into sheer cruelty, because he does everything to deprive him 
of pleasure in life, nevertheless holds fast to the belief that God is love 
... Every time that God hears praise from such a man, whom he reduces 
to the last point of world weariness, God says to himself, This is the 
right note.42
In a world of cruelty and evil and fear, who can fail to be moved by this 
reality of the faith of Kierkegaard? And yet it is not the promised abun­
dance of life which is here offered to us. In fact, there is here a demand for 
directness which is not given to us. The suffering which is undoubtedly 
inherent in living in an evil world is not the last word. But the last word is 
found in the reality of the being of God for the world in Christ, in such a 
way that the world is not destroyed but affirmed, re-affirmed. It is in this 
context that on my view the category of humour, which is more than a cate­
gory but an actual life, as we see it in Hamann, achieves its full potency of 
judgment and invitation. Certainly it is a life which is fulfilled not without 
suffering, and not without radical decision and decisiveness in and through 
the historical world. But in the last resort it is a life which indicates, to 
faith, an overcoming of the world and of history which takes place in the 
world itself.
42 Papirer XI2 A 439.
